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SYMPOSIUM
PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS: SYMBOLIC LOGIC
FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS

THE BANALITY OF LEGAL REASONING
Larry Alexander*
Law schools give pride of place to teaching students "to think like
lawyers." And despite the deflationary cast of my tide, I am not going
to debunk that part of law schools' mission. Indeed, I personally give
that task the same or greater importance than law schools generally
give it. My intention is rather to clear away the mysticism and mumbo
jumbo that is usually associated with "thinking like a lawyer" and to
claim that thinking like a lawyer is just ordinary forms of thinking
clearly and well. More precisely, thinking like a lawyer boils down to
moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deductive reasoning, and
lawyers reason in these ways exactly as everyone else does. There is no
additional form of reasoning, special to them, in which lawyers engage. Law schools are well-equipped to teach students how to think
like lawyers; but because moral, empirical, and deductive reasoning
are taught or refined in other venues, law schools have no monopoly.
I shall attempt to make my point by examining three different
reasoning environments that lawyers must confront. The first is that
of the uncontrolled case, where no canonical legal norm or precedent
governs. In that environment, lawyers employ moral or policy arguments, and these rest on ordinary moral and empirical forms of reasoning. The second reasoning environment is that of the controlling
legal norm, and in that environment lawyers employ empirical and
deductive reasoning, though moral reasoning can also be relevant in
certain ways.
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of
Law. I wish to thank Emily Sherwin and the participants in the conference on Law
and Logic for their comments, andJohn Garvey and the editors of the Notre Dame Law
Review for organizing the conference and for making it both intellectually and
humanly successful.
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The third reasoning environment is that requiring the application of precedent. Here again, I argue, lawyers will employ some combination of ordinary moral reasoning, ordinary empirical reasoning,
and ordinary deductive reasoning. There is no additional kind of reasoning-for example, "analogical reasoning"-that lawyers employ.
Nor do lawyers have access through special reasoning to norms that
might anchor analogical reasoning but that are neither posited, canonical norms nor moral principles.
I.

THE UNCONTROLLED CASE

How do lawyers think about the uncontrolled case, the case of
first impression that is governed neither by precedents nor by rules
posited constitutionally, statutorily, or administratively? In such a
case, a lawyer will ask what outcome moral principles dictate and,
where moral principles are goal dependent, what policies will achieve
the morally sanctioned goals.
A.

Reasoning About Moral Principles

When lawyers reason about moral principles, they reason in the
same way as moral philosophers and ordinary moral agents do. They
may begin with a strong judgment about how the case at hand should
be resolved as a moral matter. They will then try to formulate a general moral principle that would support that judgment. That principle will be tested in turn by the outcomes it produces in other,
perhaps hypothetical, cases. If the outcomes are at odds with strong
judgments about what the outcomes should be, then the principle will
be reformulated. Sometimes, however, the principle will be so well
supported by theories of human nature and society, and will display
such theoretical desiderata as elegance and simplicity, that the disconfirming judgments about particular cases will be reassessed and perhaps dislodged in favor of the judgments warranted by the principle.
This is especially likely if the aberrance of the disconfirming judgments can plausibly be explained by such factors as biases, irrelevant
considerations, or other sources of judgmental error.
This method of reasoning from particular moral judgments to
general moral principles and back to particular moral judgments, with
both principles and particular judgments being adjusted in light of
each other, is, of course, the method of "reflective equilibrium," first
so-called byJohn Rawls.' Notice that when reduced to its essentials, it
consists of the following building blocks: (1) moral judgments about
1

JOHN RAwLs,
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46-53 (1971).
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outcomes in particular situations; (2) abductive reasoning from those
judgments to tentative principles that would support the judgments;
(3) deductive reasoning from the principles to outcomes in other situations; and (4) empirical reasoning leading to conclusions about the
nature of man and society and about the likely influence of various
factors on moral judgments. None of these forms of judgment and
reasoning are the particular province of lawyers, which is surely a
good thing, given that every moral agent must engage in similar moral
reasoning.
To be good moral reasoners about uncontrolled cases, therefore,
lawyers must be good reasoners in a variety of ways, but none of them
special to lawyers or legal education. One need not be legally trained
to think productively about moral questions, even in legal contexts.
B.

Policy Considerations

Sometimes the application of moral principles relevant to an uncontrolled case turns on matters of policy. For example, the moral
principles that govern an accident might lead the lawyer to ask about
the costs and benefits of particular intermediate rules, such as "stop,
look, and listen at railway crossings," through which the moral principles might be implemented.
Lawyers indeed make policy arguments all the time. And when
they do, they support them with ordinary empirical reasoning, reasoning employing data gathering, hypothesis construction, experimental
design, and experimental results. Law schools have historically paid
little attention to students' skills as empiricists. Perhaps that is changing, but in no event are lawyers our best-trained empiricists.
.

THE

CASE CONTROLLED BY A CANONICAL

POSITED NoRM

Perhaps the largest number of cases the lawyer confrontsalthough traditional legal education would mislead on this pointconsists of cases requiring the application of a controlling posited
norm, whether the norm be constitutional, statutory, administrative,
orjudge-made. There are two basic steps here. First, the lawyer must
interpret the canonical norm. Second, the lawyer must apply the
norm as interpreted. Neither step involves reasoning that is unique to
lawyers or the legally trained.
A.

InterpretingPosited Norms

How lawyers should interpret posited legal norms is, of course, a
theoretical battleground. There are all sorts of theories of legal inter-
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pretation to choose among. And although I have my own preferences, I need not make a case for them here. My task is the much
more limited and manageable one of showing that no coherent theory of interpretation will require any special kinds of reasoning by
lawyers.
Most theories of interpretation of posited legal norms point
either to a straightforward empirical inquiry or to some combination
of empirical inquiry and moral evaluation. In the former category are
those theories that make either conventional understandings of texts
or authorial intentions determinative of the meaning of posited
norms. Discovering conventional understandings usually requires no
more of an empirical inquiry than consulting a dictionary and a grammar of the era whose conventional understandings are in question.
Discovering authorial intentions, on the other hand, can be a
quite difficult matter, particularly when the norm was authored in the
distant past or when there are multiple authors. And although discovering authorial intentions, like discovering any other fact about the
past, is a strictly empirical matter, moral judgments can play an evidentiary role. Thus, if possible intention A would be quite unjust or
immoral, and possible intention B would be quite the opposite, then
if we know the authors to have been morally well-intentioned, we have
some evidence that they acted with intention B. Of course, many
other things besides morality are relevant to discovering the authors'
intentions, most notably the conventional understandings of the
words they used. But on the theory that bases interpretation on authorial intent, all of these moral and factual matters other than the
intentions themselves are relevant only, not material.
There are theories of interpretation that combine empirical inquiry and moral evaluation. For example, one might argue that the
authoritative meaning of a posited legal norm is given by the authors'
intended meaning (or by the conventional understanding of the
words), unless the intended meaning (or conventional understanding) would be seriously unjust. 2 On such a theory of interpretation,
both empirical inquiry and moral evaluation are required, the latter
placing limits on what the former produces.
(There can, of course, be empirical combination approaches to
interpretation similar to the just described approach of combining an
empirical inquiry and a moral evaluation. For example, one can make
authorial intentions the touchstone of authoritative meanings so long
2 See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the
Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 357, 381-91 (Andrei Marmor ed.,

1995).
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as those meanings are not inconsistent with conventional understandings of the words. 3)
So far, none of the unitary or combination approaches to legal
interpretation requires any form of reasoning other than ordinary empirical reasoning or ordinary moral reasoning. And although legal
issues provide abundant opportunities to engage in interpretation of
posited rules and thus to engage in those forms of reasoning, neither
form of reasoning requires a legal education.
There are some theories of interpretation that not only require a
combination of different empirical inquiries or of empirical and
moral inquiries, but also require that the results of those different inquiries be "blended" to arrive at the authoritative meaning of the legal
norm. For example, some theorists argue that the meaning of a statute is a product of its text, its authorial intentions, its past judicial
interpretations, and what is good andjust.4 Moreover, these different

factors are not arranged in some clear lexical order-with text constraining intentions and both constrained by justice, for examplebut rather are factors to be mixed together in some interpretive stew.
How is the legal interpreter to ascertain the meaning rendered
up by such a nonstructured combination of different inquiries and
types of reasoning? It is here that some special faculty, the ability to
engage in what some call "practical reason," enters the picture. We
grasp the meaning of a posited legal norm through practical reasoning in light of text, authorial intentions, history, and morality.5 And
legal education is the training through which we acquire the ability to
employ such practical reasoning.
I have written elsewhere on why I think the claims on behalf of
such practical reason are hogwash. 6 No one-not even lawyers-can
meaningfully "combine" fact and value, or facts of different types, except lexically in the manner I described above. Any non-lexical "combining" of text and intentions, text and justice, and so forth is just
incoherent, like combining pi, green, and the Civil War. There is no
process of reasoning that can derive meaning from such
combinations.
3

See id. at 385.

4

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as

PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN'. L. REv. 321, 351-52 (Jan. 1990) (arguing that statutory
interpretation is a dynamic process involving the text, history, purpose, and current
values).
5 Seeid.
6 See Larry Alexander, PracticalReason and Statutory Interpretation,12 LAw & PHIL.
319 (1993).
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The conclusion must be that interpreting legal norms is a
nonmysterious process employing ordinary empirical and perhaps
moral reasoning. Lawyers employ such forms of reasoning, but they
do so along with many others and in the same way. There is no special lawyers' way of thinking when it comes to legal interpetation.
B.

Applying Posited Norms

Lawyers, of course, do not only interpret legal norms. Mter they
have decided what those norms mean, they then must apply those
norms to the facts.
There is surely nothing special about this process, however, for
what it requires is nothing more than ordinary deductive logic. By
saying this, I do not mean to minimize deductive logic or the skill
necessary to employ it well. Indeed, I would locate the heart of what it
means to think like a lawyer here, in the domain of deductive logic.
For I think that what a really well-trained lawyer is particularly good
at-or at least what a particularly well-trained law student is particularly good at-is precisely the ability to reason deductively, especially
from complex norms. That is why I believe Rodes and Pospesel are
right on the mark in their emphasis on deductive reasoning. 7 That is
why I frequently give my students problems in propositional logic
8
from Raymond Smullyan's delightful What Is the Name of This Book?
and tell them that honing their deductive skills is perhaps the most
important thing they will do in law school.
Deductive skill in applying norms to facts is both central to the
lawyers' enterprise and not highly developed in most spheres of life.
And law schools have historically been known for drilling students in
applied as opposed to formal deductive logic, though it is my impression that we are easing up on that front and replacing the emphasis
on logical precision with more information and training in other
skills. In any event, if "thinking like a lawyer" is thinking logically,
then the non-legally-trained can also think like lawyers. There is no
special trick that lawyers know here.

7
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The Search for a Special Form of Legal Reasoning

1. The Problem
Thus far I have discussed uncontrolled cases and cases controlled
by posited canonical norms. In neither must the lawyer employ forms
of reasoning that are unique to law. There is a third category of cases,
however, and it is in this category that proponents of lawyers' special
know-how are likely to argue we should look. After all, the classic
works on legal reasoning, such as Edward Levi's, 9 used examples, not
of cases of first impression, nor of application of established rules, but
of deriving and then applying norms from precedent cases. Although
applying the norms once derived is merely a matter of deduction, deriving the norms is presented as something different from any of the
processes of reasoning described above. Perhaps, then, it is in deriving norms from precedent cases that lawyers employ some special
form of reasoning.
As a preliminary matter, it is clear that for reasoning from precedent cases to be special, the precedent cases must not be regarded as
having laid down canonical rules to govern future cases. For if constraint by precedent is no more than following canonical rules posited
by precedent courts, there are no norms to "derive" from the precedent cases. There are merely posited rules to be interpreted through
the empirical or lexically-ordered empirical/moral techniques described in Part II.
Nor would precedential reasoning be special if present courts
merely must take account of the existence of the precedent decisions
in deciding what is morally best to do, all things considered. In other
words, a court reasoning in a purely moral manner will have to take
into account the state of the world in which it operates, and precedent
cases-like other past events-will have left their traces in the world
of the present cases, most notably in the form of reliance.' 0
Not only will a court reasoning in a purely moral manner take
into account the present traces of precedent decisions, such as reliance, but it will also take into account (1) the extant rules that it has
no authority to overturn, (2) the moral wisdom potentially embodied
in precedent decisions, and (3) its own limitations of time, foresight,
and wisdom. These three considerations will ordinarily produce
9
10

(1963).
See Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles,in LAW
EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING

TATION 279, 299-300 (Andrei Marmor, ed., 1995).
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norms that are fairly specific and limited in their domain, and that
cohere well with most of the corpusjuris. Such norms may appear to
be derived from precedent, but of course they are not.
Thus, under a theory of precedential constraint in which what is
binding in a precedent is a rule posited by the precedent court, the
subsequent courts merely interpret and apply the posited rule. And
under a theory of precedential constraint in which precedents are
merely facts to be taken account of by subsequent courts seeking the
morally best outcomes, the courts employ ordinary moral reasoning.
Under neither theory of precedent could the subsequent courts be
said to be "deriving" a norm from the precedent cases, much less reasoning in any novel manner.
The theory of precedential constraint that promises a unique way
of reasoning is one that goes as follows: The present court looks at the
facts and the results of various precedent cases and then asks which of
the cases is most "like"-analogous to-the case at hand. The court
"grasps" the proper analogy-"This case is more like case x than case
y"-and then tries to draft a norm that would cover and 'Justify" the
past and present outcomes. That norm, however, can be ignored by a
subsequent court. Only the present result is binding on it,just as only
the past results were binding on the present court."'
2.

The Possibility for Error

Notice that as this process of so-called analogical reasoning from
precedent is described, courts' articulated rationales are viewed as corrigible, but their ability to grasp proper analogies is viewed as incorrigible. Therefore, we are asked not only to accept a judicial ability to
grasp what is "like" and "unlike" what, but also to accept that this ability is infallible.
I believe we should reject both propositions. Courts reason about
rather than grasp intuitively to which precedent cases the cases before
them should be assimilated. Or at least they purport to reason about
this, which is why they write opinions that purport to describe their
reasoning. Moreover, we must assume that if they are reasoning, then
they may be reasoning incorrectly, which would explain, among other
things, such phenomena as dissents, overrulings of precedent, and interstate differences in common law doctrine.
We must assume, therefore, that the environment in which courts
are to employ analogical reason-or what I shall now call ARIL, an
11

See Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent,63 S. CAL.L. REV. 3, 28-34 (1989).
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acronym for analogical reasoning in law12 -is one in which part of the
corpus juris is infected by error. That is, some of the materials with
which ARIL must work are unjustified.
It is important to note that the problem of moral error embedded in past judicial decisions, statutes, and other legal materials does
not affect the other methodologies I have described: ordinary moral
reasoning to determine the morally best decision in a case (the
method of reflective equilibrium) and ordinary empirical methodology to discover the meaning of a legal rule qua legislative intent (or
public understanding). Ordinary moral reasoning will take account
of all the present effects of past decisions, including morally erroneous ones. Because we operate morally in the world as we find it-a
world in which many of its features are the residue of past moral mistakes-we must take account of those mistakes in order to act morally.
For example, we surely must take into account present reliance on
past decisions, even if those decisions were morally mistaken. And we
must take into account present institutional features when we reason
morally about what to do, even if those institutional features are not
morally optimal.
Although moral reasoning must take account of past moral error
in the ways just described, it need not abandon correct moral principles in doing so. In other words, it need not resort to any norms
other than the correct moral norms it discovers through proper moral
reasoning. Those norms dictate what to do in light of past moral mistakes. Thus, past moral mistakes do not alter the norms themselves,
or the methodology for discovering them.
The same relation or lack of relation holds between past moral
error and the discovery of legislative intent. To the extent we can
explain past moral mistakes, we can be more confident that we have
correctly ascertained what some legislative body intended by its text if
our tentative conclusion is that the intent embraces the moral error.
Our method is always abductive and inductive in the ordinary manner
of empirical inquiry. We are still looking for the legally significant
fact-intent or understanding-and moral mistakes are just part of
the evidentiary stew. We do not seek principles to justify them, but
rather facts to explain them. And, of course, once we have interpreted the rule, deduction is the only reasoning we need, for deduction operates just as well from morally mistaken rules as from morally
correct ones.
12

I introduced the acronym in Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L.
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To summarize, past moral mistakes can be handled by ordinary
empirical and normative methods. Past moral mistakes are, of course,
problems for those adversely affected by them. They are not, however, problems for the methodologies.
B.

A Description of ARIL

ARIL purports to be a methodology by which the courts-and
anyone legally trained-can, through the process of reasoning it
prescribes, 'justify" a decision as being more "like" some precedent
decisions than it is "like" others, where some of those precedent decisions may be mistaken. For ARIL to be a reasoning process as opposed to an intuitive grasping of likeness and difference, it will
require postulating a norm or set of norms that 'Jusify" the precedents and prescribe an outcome in the case at hand. It will be in
terms of such a norm or norms that statements of likeness and difference will be supported. Obviously, cases are both like and different
from other cases in an indefinite number of ways. The relevance of
likenesses and differences must be determined by norms that supply
the criteria of relevance. This much seems obvious.
Therefore, we need norms that justify precedent decisions, some
of which may be mistaken. ARIL is supposed to be the method of
reasoning by which such norms are discovered. Following Scott
Brewer,.let us call the norms that provide the criteria for supporting
claims of likeness and difference "analogy warranting rules" (AWRs),
and let us call the background principles that justify the AWRs "analogy warranting rationales" (AWRas). 1 3 Under ARIL, we survey the
facts and outcomes (but not the stated rationales for) the precedent
cases, abduce possible covering AWRs, test each AWR against AWRas
by asking whether the decisions the AWR authorizes comport with the
AWRas, and finally select the best of the eligible AWRs. That AWR
supplies the criteria for determining the outcome in the case at hand,
which outcome in turn determines to which precedents it is relevantly
analogous.
C.

ARIL and Reflective Equilibrium Compared and Contrasted

Now ARIL looks deceptively like the method of reflective equilibrium used in moral reasoning that I described earlier. That method
requires working holistically with and making adjustments among particular judgments, formulations of moral principles, and background
13 See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational
Force of Legal Argument by Analog,, 109 HARv. L. REv. 923, 962-65 (1996).
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theories of human nature and society. ARIL works the same way with
AWRs, AWRas, and particular judgments. But consider these distincions between reflective equilibrium and ARIL.
First, the reasoner employing reflective equilibrium ultimately
tests the moral principles she is considering against her own moraljudgments about particular examples. Yet ARIL gives prominence to others'
judgments about particular examples, namely, the judgments of the
precedent courts and the legislators. To be sure, the court deciding
the instant case must itself decide what the moral principles are to
which those judgments of others point. But it must accept these
moral judgments of others about particular examples as fixed points
in its own reasoning.
I do not mean to imply that the moral judgments of others have
no role in reflective equilibrium. Quite the contrary is true. Nonetheless, those judgments of others are evidentiary for the reasoner; they
bear on the confidence she has in her own particularjudgments. The
judgments of others are never canonical for her. Moreover, she takes
good evidence where she finds it. For her, the particular moral judgments of the Harvard Philosophy Department might carry significanfly more weight than the judgments of the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas or the Pennsylvania legislature. Yet ARIL subordinates
the former to the latter. ARIL precludes her from deciding that the
particular judgments of the courts or the legislature are incorrect,
even if the inconsistent judgments of the Harvard Philosophy Department, as incorporated into her own moral judgments, would so declare. ARIL gives the particular judgments of others-indeed, the
particular judgments of particular others, namely, courts and legislatures-a different status from the status they would have under reflective equilibrium.
A second difference between ARIL and reflective equilibrium lies
in the rigidity or fixity of the particular judgments with which the reasoner must deal. If the reasoner were employing the method of reflective equilibrium to determine the morally best decision in the case
before her, she might adjust not only her abduced moral principles to
fit with her particular judgments, but also her particularjudgments to
fit with her moral principles. Whether she would adjust her principles
or her judgments would depend on the relative degree of confidence
she had in each. As Brewer correctly notes, the adjustments that occur in the method of reflective equilibrium are holistic and at least
14
potentially bidirectional.
14
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ARIL, however, does not permit adjustment of the particular
judgments that serve as precedents. The particular judgments about
carriages, saws, urns, lamps, and so forth that the MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.15 court had to deal with were fixed for it. Thosejudgments
could not be revised to fit the court's moral principles. Nor could
they be disregarded. The same holds true, of course, for the particular judgments of legislatures embodied in statutes that a court wishes
to treat like precedents in reasoning, per ARIL, to a result in a case
not covered by the statute. This fixity or rigidity of the particular judgments of others that ARIL must work with distinguishes ARIL quite
clearly from reflective equilibrium.
The third difference between ARIL and reflective equilibrium lies
in the rationale-filtered manner in which a court has access to precedent cases. Precedent cases do not present themselves in all their particularity to the court employing ARIL. Rather, the particularity with
which a present court can perceive a precedent case is entirely dependent on the precedent court's opinion and the detail about the case
contained therein. The amount and the selection of that detail in the
opinion will be a function of the precedent court's rationale for deciding the case. The precedent court may have favored a standard under
which a large number of adjudicative facts in the case were deemed
material and worth mentioning in the opinion. On the other hand,
the precedent court may have favored a broad, blunt rule that rendered most adjudicative facts in the case entirely immaterial.
Now as I have said, ARIL dispenses with the rationales of precedent cases. The reason again is that ARIL is supposed to be something other than deductive reasoning from rationales already
established. Nonetheless, ARIL cannot capture past cases in their full
particularity, but rather must confront them as stylized, rationale-encrusted judgments of other courts.
Reflective equilibrium, on the other hand, allows and encourages
the moral reasoner to add facts to and subtract facts from imaginary
situations in order to discern how her moral judgments are affected
and to identify the governing moral principles. The cases that the
moral reasoner considers can be as detailed and as customized as she
wishes because they are products of her moral imagination, not actual
past events whose description has been forever fixed by others.
These three ways in which ARIL differs from the method of reflective equilibrium are, of course, related. The fact that ARIL depends on judgments of others explains why those judgments are fixed
and why they are rationale-encrusted. The bottom line is that ARIL
15

111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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cannot be the method of reflective equilibrium, even though the latter, like the former, relies on examples.
I do not wish to be misunderstood to be saying that a court cannot take account of precedent cases and statutes while employing reflective equilibrium to reach the morally best decision in the case
before it. If reflective equilibrium is the proper method for determining the morally correct course of action to take, then reflective equilibrium will have to take account of facts about the world, including
past court decisions and their stated rationales and existing statutes.
These facts matter morally, but they do not matter in the way ARIL
16
describes. When we reason morally, we take account of those facts.
When we employ ARIL, we are supposed to be anchored to them.
D. ARL and Legal Principles
Thus far, I have attempted to show that ARIL cannot be ordinary
moral reasoning that takes into account past legal decisions, and that
ARIL cannot be ordinary empirical inquiry into legislative intent (or
public understanding) that takes into account examples in legal texts.
If we look for ARIL in those precincts, we shall not find it.
There is an alternative location where I believe ARIL can be
found: ARIL is the method of divining legal principles immanent in
the case decisions and in the decisions of legislative bodies. ARIL is
not the method for understanding canonical legal texts, as I have explained. Nor is it the method for applying canonical texts, which is
merely deductive. Rather, ARIL functions when a case is not controlled by a canonical text, as when no extant text covers the case, or
when the text that covers it is not canonical and can be disregarded,
such as some accounts ofjudicial texts. What ARIL directs a court to
do in such situations is to find the legal principles immanent in the
legal materials and apply those principles to the case at hand.
Now, what are these immanent legal principles? I am going to
give the best account of them I can, but because I am quite skeptical
about the normative status of immanent legal principles, my account
should be viewed warily.
Immanent legal principles are legal norms that are not posited by
a legal decisionmaker. As I said, if they were posited norms, they
would be subjects not for ARIL but for interpretation-empirical inquiry-and deduction. Rather than being posited norms, immanent
legal principles arise from the posited legal materials, and justify
16 See Alexander & Kress, supranote 10, at 299-300; Alexander, supra note 11, at
15; Larry Alexander, Striking Back At the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's
Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHIL. 419, 433 (1987).
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them. For example, the court in MacPherson could be described as
having found in the array of past cases-though not in their stated
rationales-the legal principle that it announced regarding negligence and privity, which principle justified the decisions both in MacPherson and in the precedent cases.
Just as immanent legal principles are not posited norms, neither
are they moral norms. Although they 'Justify" past legal decisions,
they do not do so morally, at least not straightforwardly. If they were
moral norms, then, as I have argued, they would be discovered
through the method of reflective equilibrium, not through ARIL.
ARIL as the method for discovering immanent legal principles
squares rather well with Brewer's account of ARIL. A court faced with
an array of past decisions, shorn of their nonauthoritative rationales,
abduces a principle (the AWR) that would fit with those past decisions. It tests that principle for plausibility against background moral
considerations (the AWRas). If the principle both fits the decisions
and is morally attractive, the principle is the principle immanent in
those decisions and is the gauge of relevant "likeness" and "unlikeness" in analogical reasoning from the cases.
I think that this story about immanent legal principles is the best
account that can be given of ARIL. Notice that on this account ARIL
appears to be, as many of its advocates contend, not some mystical,
intuitive grasping of "likeness" and "unlikeness," but a form of practical reasoning. Notice also that on this account ARIL explains how
past cases can constrain future decisions-as the principle of stare decisis requires-even though the past cases are shorn of their rationales.
Notice finally that on this account ARIL truly is a distinctive methodology of practical reasoning, one that can support the autonomy of law.
Even as I have presented this account of ARIL so far, it has
problems. For example, because ARIL is supposed to operate onjudicial decisions and not the rationales for those decisions-else it would
be merely interpretation and deduction-we need some way to overcome the problem to which I earlier adverted: judicial decisions are
accessible to later courts only through their rationales. Nevertheless, I
wish to assume that ARIL can overcome this problem. A far greater
problem confronts it-past judicial and legislative mistakes.
1. The Problem of Bad Beginnings
We have concluded that the most plausible account of ARIL is
one in which ARIL is neither ordinary moral reasoning nor ordinary
empirical reasoning. Rather, it is one in which ARIL seeks legal principles immanent in past legal decisions, that is, principles that justify
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those decisions. Those principles are what give us the criteria of likeness and unlikeness required for analogical reasoning.
Our path has also shown us that, almost surely, many of the legal
materials in which the justifying legal principles are supposedly immanent will turn out to be morally mistaken. The situation of ajudge or
lawyer seeking the legal principles immanent in the legal materials is
therefore similar to that of a zoologist asked to continue a project of
sorting animals into "fish" and "mammals." The previous zoologist
who had begun the project had classified the animals she had studied
in the following manner:
FISH
Flounder
Mackerel
Whale Shark
Whale
Porpoise
MAMMALS
Elephant
Pig
Kangaroo
Bat
The new zoologist now must classify a seal, and he must accept his
predecessor's classificationsas authoritative. The question for him thus becomes whether-given the predecessor's classifications-a seal is
more "like" a porpoise (fish) or more "like" a bat (mammal), or, put
differently, how the principles of mammaldom and fishdom "immanent" in and 'justificatory" of his predecessor's classifications work in
the case of seals.
It should be obvious that if the zoologist must treat his predecessor's list as authoritative, he will find it impossible to classify seals
nonarbitrarily. He will, of course, be able to point to ways in which
seals are like and unlike both porpoises and bats, as he will when he
moves on to sea otters, river otters, beavers, raccoons, and bears.
(Note how the direction of progression through these examples will
affect his answers, which should not, but likely will be, path-dependent.) All things are like and unlike all other things in myriad ways.
The zoologist needs the correct principles for classifying fish and
mammals, for only those principles will establish the relevant bases for
judgments of likeness and unlikeness. Yet the predecessor's mistakes
have made that impossible. Does not the same hold true for a judge
or lawyer employing ARIL in. the real-world context of past legal
error?
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Dworkin and Justifying the Unjustified

ARIL requires that we justify the unjustified. Ronald Dworkin
has, of course, put forward a jurisprudential theory in which legal
17
principles immanent in the legal materials play the major role.
Those principles must "fit" the legal materials (shorn of their rationales)-as the AWRs must fit with the past cases-and must be the
most morally acceptable of the principles that satisfy the criterion of
"fit," with moral acceptability gauged by reference to correct moral
principles (the AWRas).
Because of moral mistakes embedded in the legal materials, however, the legal principles immanent in the legal materials-those that
score highest on the fit and acceptability axes-will differ from correct moral principles. (In Brewer's terms, the legal AWRs will not cohere completely with the moralAWRas.) Legal principles for Dworkin
can be characterized counterfactually as those principles that would
be correct moral principles in a world in which the morally incorrect
past decisions were morally correct.' 8 To illustrate the claim graphically, for a judge confronting, say, Plessy v. Ferguson19 and similar decisions, the legal principles immanent in those decisions are those
principles that would be morally correct in a world in which "separate
but equal" were morally correct.
I have argued in several other works that Dworkin's account of
legal principles, even if coherent-compare it with "What would seals
be in a world in which porpoises were fish?"-renders legal principles
normatively unattractive and ontologically queer.20 Legal principles
do not have the virtue of bright-line rules, which, even if not morally
optimal, provide clear guidance. Nor do legal principles have the virtue of correct moral principles, because they are not necessarily morally correct. Moreover, the best answer to the counterfactual question
that describes legal principles-what would be morally correct in a
world in which moral errors were not errors-is "act on correct moral
principles except in past cases of moral error." That injunction is no
different in any practical sense from an injunction to follow correct
17 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 238-50 (1986) (explaining the process
that judges use to discover immanent legal principles); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-39 (1977) (arguing that judges use principles, not just rules, to
decide cases).
18 See Alexander & Kress, supra note 10, at 288 n.47 (arguing that such a
counterfactual approach describes the dominant methodology for dealing with prece-

dential constraint).
19 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20 See Alexander & Kress, supranote 10, at 299-300; Alexander, supra note 12, at
15; Alexander, supra note 16.
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moral principles, which requires the method of reflective equilibrium,
not ARIL.
Correct moral principles will never dictate their own abandonment. They might dictate that we follow bright-line rules, even at
some moral cost in particular cases, in return for greater moral benefits generally (moral costs and benefits calculated by reference to the
correct moral principles). Correct moral principles, however, will reject all other purported justificatory principles as counterfeit.
IV. THE BANAL=rY OF LEGAL REASONING
ARIL would definitely be a distinctive type of reasoning about
legal matters, one unique to law and lawyers and capable of making
law schools' mission of teaching students "to think like lawyers" something different from teaching them to think well but in ordinary, undistinctive ways. But ARIL is a chimera. We lawyers, if we are thinking
properly-and teaching our students to do the same-do nothing
more than engage in ordinary empirical reasoning, ordinary moral
reasoning, and ordinary deductive reasoning.
Of course, doing those three well and teaching our students to do
so are not to be sneezed at. Indeed, we probably do only a fair job
teaching what we are best equipped to teach-deductive reasoningdo much less well in teaching our students to think carefully and well
about moral issues, and probably make no progress at all in improving
our students' empirical skills. So even if the ways lawyers reason are
not special, there is a lot of room for improving lawyers' reasoning
abilities. And achieving excellence in these reasoning abilities, however nonspecial they are, is surely to be prized.
Thus, when I say that legal reasoning is banal, I am not minimizing its importance or its difficulty. I am merely stripping it of mystique and countering obscurantist claims on its behalf. Law requires
reasoning, but of perfectly ordinary kinds. And for that we as citizens
should be thankful, even if we as lawyers and law teachers lose a bit of
our special priesthood aura in the eyes of others.
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